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1. Entitlement theories and the principle of origin 









3. The OECD’s “new taxing right” 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
One of the main functions of international tax law is determining how to 
allocate rights to tax international income among states. The distribution of 
WD[LQJULJKWVKDVEHHQKLVWRULFDOO\MXVWL¿HGE\ZKDWFDQEHJHQHUDOO\FDOOHG 
origin-based approaches. Origin-based allocation purports that states 
should be entitled to tax income generated in their territories or arising 
from the resources they control. A variety of theoretical approaches entails 
the allocation of taxing rights according to the origin of income, such as the 
EHQH¿WVWKHRU\WKHFRVWVWKHRU\WKHHQWLWOHPHQWWKHRU\WKHIDFXOW\WKHRU\ 
the economic allegiance theory and, more recently, the idea of allocating 
income according to value creation. These theories ultimately imply that 
taxing rights must align with the location of the factors contributing to the 
generation of income. 
Recent developments in the international tax scene suggest a re-
examination of the normative underpinnings of the current distribution of 
the international tax base. The global changes arising from the digitalization 
of the economy have motivated countries to reconsider the allocation of 





is created have spurred skepticism about the suitability of origin-based 
theories to justify the allocation of taxing rights. 
This article argues that origin-based approaches still hold valid as 
QRUPDWLYH FULWHULD EXW DUH VLJQL¿FDQWO\ OLPLWHG LQ VFRSH 2ULJLQEDVHG 
theories overestimate the feasibility of determining the origin of income 
and take for granted some of the complexities resulting from economic 
JOREDOL]DWLRQ $ JUHDW SDUW RI WKH JOREDO SURGXFWLRQ WRGD\ ÀRZV IURP 
supply and demand chains that span across multiple sectors and countries. 
Accurately pinpointing the factors that gave rise to a given income, and 
WKHLUUHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQLVDGL൶FXOWLIQRWLPSRVVLEOHWDVN0RUHRYHU 
the strong disagreement between countries about which economic 
factors should determine the allocation of taxing rights has recently led 
to a greater consideration of distributional consequences. Tax policy 
discussions on how to allocate taxing rights increasingly rely on impact 
assessments, suggesting a continued move from an origin-based toward 
a consequentialist approach. The increasing role of the distributional 
LPSOLFDWLRQV RI GL൵HUHQW WD[ GHVLJQ FKRLFHV UHTXLUHV QRUPDWLYH FULWHULD 
that go beyond an origin-based rationale and include distributive justice 
considerations. 
An alternative normative approach, which can be called the 
GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK ZDUUDQWV WKDW WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI ULJKWV EHWZHHQ 
states promotes global distributive justice. From this perspective, taxing 
right allocation should aim to address the existing economic inequalities 
between countries. The article’s main argument is that the diminished 
scope of, and continued departure from, origin-based approaches give rise 
to a normative claim that the disputed portion of the international tax base 
VKRXOGEHDOORFDWHGWRWKHEHQH¿WRIOHVVD൷XHQWFRXQWULHVWRKHOSDGGUHVV 
their development needs. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the 
normative foundations of origin-based theories, which still predominate in 
international tax circles, and discusses some of their practical limitations. 
3DUW,,DQDO\]HVWKHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKDQGGLVFXVVHVKRZLWUHFRQFLOHV 
with origin-based approaches. Part III presents the implications of this 
alternative normative standard, particularly in proposals that incorporate 
IRUPXODU\DSSURDFKHVWRWKHDOORFDWLRQRIJOREDOEXVLQHVVSUR¿WV 
I. Origin-based approaches 
1. Entitlement theories and the principle of origin 
A variety of theories attempt to explain the existing rules for entitling 
countries to tax a given income. They can be broadly categorized as origin-
























of the factors that have contributed to the generation of income. Perhaps 
one of the clearest and most long-standing explanations for the current 
international allocation of taxing rights is the HFRQRPLFDOOHJLDQFHWKHRU\ 
It was notably advanced in the 1920s by four economists commissioned 
by the League of Nations to evaluate the then-current international tax 
system.1 Their report is widely considered to have formed the basis of the 
present international tax rules.2 The economic allegiance theory submits 
that income should be allocated among countries according to “the origin 
of the income or the place where the earnings are created.”3 This came 
to be known as the SULQFLSOHRIRULJLQ4 The underlying rationale is that 
LQGLYLGXDOVDQGFRUSRUDWLRQVEHQH¿WIURPDQGKDYHHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVLQ 
the states where their income is produced, possessed and disposed of.5 As 
IDU DV WKH\ EHQH¿W IURP VHUYLFHV LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG PDUNHW DQG ODERXU 
access from these states, they build a connection that implies a duty to pay 
taxes.6 
Alternative explanatory theories build on similar normative reasoning. 
The EHQH¿WV WKHRU\ requires the allocation of taxing rights according to 
WKHEHQH¿WVGHULYHG IURPHDFKFRXQWU\¶VSURYLVLRQRISXEOLFJRRGV DQG 
VHUYLFHV7,WLVRIWHQMXVWL¿HGE\WKHHWKLFDOREOLJDWLRQRIDWD[SD\HUWRSD\ 
IRUWKHEHQH¿WVFRQIHUUHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHQRWLRQRIDQLPSOLHG 
1. Bruins et al, Report on Double Taxation, submitted to the Financial Committee, League of 
Nations, Geneva, 1923, League of Nations Doc EFS 73 [1923 Report]. 
2. See Michael J Graetz, “Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, 
and Unsatisfactory Policies” (2001) 26:4 Brook J Int’l L 1357 at 1358. 
3. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 24. For an overview, see RSJ Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in 
International Law (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989) at 23-41. 
4. See Eric CCM Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models
(Dongen, The Netherlands: Pijnenburg, 2001). 
5. See 1923 Report, supraQRWH GH¿QLQJSURGXFWLRQRIZHDOWKDVHQFRPSDVVLQJ³DOOWKHVWDJHV 
up to the point when the physical production has reached a complete economic destination and can be 
acquired as wealth,” possession of wealth as the “range of functions relating to establishing the title to 
the wealth and preserving it [which takes place] between the actual fruition of production into wealth 
and the disposing of it in consumption” and disposition of wealth as “the stage when the wealth has 
UHDFKHGLWV¿QDORZQHUZKRLVHQWLWOHGWRXVHLWLQZKDWHYHUZD\KHFKRRVHV+HFDQFRQVXPHLWRU 
waste it, or re-invest it; but the exercise of his will to do any of these things resides with him and there 
his ability to pay taxes is apparent” at 22-23). See also Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation 
of Income—A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part I)” (1988) 16:8-9 Intertax 216 at 223-
228 (explaining that the origin of income “refers to a state that in some way or other is connected to 
the production of the income in question, to the state where value is added to a good”). 
6. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18. See also Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of 
Income—A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III)” (1988) 16:11 Intertax 393 at 398 
(pointing out that a taxpayer integrated in the economic life of a state owes a certain degree of 
HFRQRPLFDOOHJLDQFHWRLWVJRYHUQPHQWDVDFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHFRVWVLQFXUUHGWRSURYLGHWKHEHQH¿WV 
that contributed to the earning of the income). 
7. Richard A Musgrave & Peggy B Musgrave, “Inter-Nation Equity” in Richard M Bird & John G 
Head, eds, 0RGHUQ)LVFDO,VVXHV(VVD\VLQ+RQRURI&DUO66KRXS 7RURQWRDQG%X൵DOR8QLYHUVLW\ 





















contract between the taxpayer and the country imposing the tax.8 The costs 
WKHRU\ takes the perspective of the state and aligns tax entitlement with the 
FRVWRIWKHVHUYLFHVSHUIRUPHGE\WKHVWDWHUDWKHUWKDQWKHEHQH¿WVGHULYHG 
from these services.97KHEHQH¿WVDQG WKHFRVWV WKHRULHVDUHFRQVLGHUHG 
two variants of the H[FKDQJH WKHRU\, which premises on the economic 
rationale that states and taxpayers exchange services and tax payments.10 
The HQWLWOHPHQWWKHRU\LVFRQVLGHUHGWRJREH\RQGWKHEHQH¿WVWKHRU\IRU 
including not only services provided by the government but also other 
factors (such as access to markets and productive resources) that contribute 
to the creation of income.11 The IDFXOW\WKHRU\, commonly known as the 
DELOLW\WRSD\WKHRU\, is also considered a more comprehensive substitute 
IRU WKHEHQH¿WV WKHRU\12 According to the faculty theory, in addition to 
WKH EHQH¿WV SURYLGHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW WR WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI LQFRPH 
the allocation of taxing rights should consider the costs incurred by 
the government to allow for the consumption of that income.13 A more 
recent attempt to explain the alignment of taxing rights with the place of 
economic activity is the YDOXHFUHDWLRQ WKHRU\ It has been advanced in 
international tax circles as a basis for aligning taxing rights with where 
economic activities leading to the creation of income are performed.14 The 
value creation theory is considered to expand the scope of the existing 
criteria for distributing the international tax base to include the location of 
consumers and users of goods and services, premised on the idea that they 
contribute to the creation of income.15 
8. Nancy H Kaufman, “Fairness and the Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 Law & 
Pol’y Intl Bus 145 at 184; Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. 
International Taxation” (2005) 25:2 Va Tax Rev 313 at 315. Adopting a similar view, some have 
argued for a principle of membership, according to which “individuals and companies should be 
YLHZHGDVPHPEHUVLQWKRVHFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH\EHQH¿WIURPWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUH´ 
DQGWKHUHIRUH³SROLWLHVVKRXOGKDYHDQH൵HFWLYHULJKWWRWD[LQGLYLGXDOVDQGFRPSDQLHVDVWKH\VHH¿W´ 
(Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, “Tax Competition and Global Background Justice” (2014) 22:2 J Pol 
Phil 150 at 157-158). 
9. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18. 
10. Richard Abel Musgrave, “The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy” (1939) 53:2 QJ 
Econ 213 at 214-215. 
11. Thomas Rixen, 7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO7D[*RYHUQDQFH (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) at 59. 
12. See e.g. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18; Edwin RA Seligman, “The Theory of Progressive 
Taxation” (1893) 8:2 Pol Sci Q 220; Kaufman, supra note 8 at 184; J Clifton Fleming Jr, Robert J 
Peroni & Stephen E Shay, “Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing 
Worldwide Income” (2001) 5 Fla Tax Rev 299. 
13. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18. 
14. OECD,$GGUHVVLQJWKH7D[&KDOOHQJHVRIWKH'LJLWDO(FRQRP\$FWLRQ²)LQDO5HSRUW
(Paris: OECD, 2015). 
15. See e.g. Itai Grinberg, “User Participation in Value Creation” (2018) 2018:4 Brit Tax Rev 
407. But see Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, “Taxing Where Value Is Created: What’s ‘User 

















These theories have been used in tax scholarship to explain two 
main principles for how to allocate tax entitlement. The source principle
recognizes the entitlement of a state to tax all income arising within its 
ERUGHUV7KHWD[HQWLWOHPHQWRIWKHVRXUFHFRXQWU\GHULYHVIURPWKHEHQH¿WV 
it provides to the economic factors that contribute to the generation of 
income, such as services, infrastructure, natural resources, educated or 
low-cost labour, and access to market.16 The residence principle entitles 
the state where an individual or corporation resides to tax its worldwide 
income. Residents are held to owe taxes as a return for the rights and 
SULYLOHJHVWKH\UHFHLYHDVUHVLGHQWVDVZHOODVIRUWKHEHQH¿WVDFFUXLQJWR 
their productive factors prior to foreign investment.17 
Although there is no clear consensus as to which theory provides 
the most adequate normative basis for taxing right allocation, what these 
theories hold in common is that they all rely on some variant of the 
principle of origin, that is, the broad notion that the location of the factors 
that contributed to the creation of income should determine which state is 
entitled to tax it. 
2. Normative basis 
2ULJLQEDVHG DSSURDFKHV FDQ EH MXVWL¿HG E\ WKH QRWLRQ RI VRYHUHLJQW\ 
Sovereignty requires states to respect the independence and autonomy of 
other states and recognize their territorial integrity.18 The sovereignty of a 
VWDWHUHÀHFWVLQLWVMXULVGLFWLRQZKLFKFRPSULVHVLWVOHJDOSRZHUVZLWKLQDQ 
international society of states.19 States are thus entitled to the productive 
factors within their territories.20 
of value creation is generally interpreted, see David Quentin, “Corporate Tax Reform and ‘Value 
Creation’: Towards Unfettered Diagonal Re-allocation across the Global Inequality Chain” (2017) 
7 Acc Econ & L 1; Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, “Taxing Income Where Value is 
Created” (2018) 22:1 Fla Tax Rev 1; Michael P Devereux & John Vella, “Value Creation as the 
Fundamental Principle of the International Corporate Tax System” (2018) European Tax Policy Forum 
Working Paper, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3275759> [perma.cc/QWC4-NJ5L]. 
16. Peggy B Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination: National Taxation in a 
*OREDOL]LQJ:RUOG´LQ,QJH.DXO 	3HGUR&RQFHLoƗRHGVThe New Public Finance: Responding to 
*OREDO&KDOOHQJHV(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 167 at 172 [Musgrave, “Combining”]. 
17. Ibid at 168-169. 
18. Territorial integrity is generally regarded as a foundational principle of international law given 
the major role of territorial disputes in enduring interstate rivalries and war. See Mark W Zacher, “The 
Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force” (2001) 55:2 Int’l Org 215. 
See also JL Brierly, “Règles générales du droit de la paix” (1936) 58 Recueil des Cours 1 (pointing 
to the fundamental relationship between jurisdiction and state territory). For a broader discussion, see 
Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
19. Frederick A Mann, “The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law” (1964) 111 Recueil des 
Cours 1. 
20. Laurens van Apeldoorn, “International Tax Co-operation in an Unjust World: Do States Have an 














The source and the residence principles of international tax law are 
deeply rooted in the two fundamental cornerstones of international law, 
territoriality and nationality, respectively. Territoriality establishes that 
a state has jurisdiction over events, persons or things in its territory, 
including cross-border events that are only partially in its territory 
DQG H[WHUQDO DFWV WKDW SURGXFH H൵HFWV ZLWKLQ LWV WHUULWRU\21 Nationality 
establishes a connection based on the relationship between an individual 
and a sovereign and extends state authority over events taking place beyond 
QDWLRQDOERUGHUV$OWKRXJKFRQFHSWXDOO\GL൵HUHQWQDWLRQDOLW\ LQJHQHUDO 
international law) and residence (in international tax law) derive from 
the same normative rationale, namely the personal, rather than territorial, 
connections between a state and an individual as a source of authority.22 
Sovereignty, thus, generally implies that states should be entitled 
to the wealth generated in their territories or arising from the resources 
they control. From this perspective, establishing tax entitlements entails 
determining the causal relationship between economic factors and the 
income arising from these factors. According to origin-based approaches, 
this relationship between the entitlement to a given income and the origin 
of that income is the fundamental standard for distributing the international 
tax base. 
3. Limitations 
Two circumstances limit the scope of origin-based approaches as 
QRUPDWLYH FULWHULD IRU DOORFDWLQJ WD[LQJ ULJKWV7KH ¿UVW SUREOHP LV WKDW 
WKH\DUHGL൶FXOWWRLPSOHPHQWLQSUDFWLFH2ULJLQEDVHGDSSURDFKHVQHHG 
to determine where the income was generated (which generally requires 
considering every factor without which such income would not have 
come to exist)23 and establish how much each factor has contributed to 
21. Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law” (2014) 84:1 Brit YB Intl L 187 at 
194-196. 
22. See DW Bowett, “Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources” 
(1982) 53:1 Brit YB Intl L 1 at 8-9 (noting that the resident’s links with a state are as close as those 
of a national for the purposes of particular areas of regulation, such as taxation, currency and military 
service obligations). One reason why residence usually substitutes for nationality in tax law is the 
prevalence in tax law of economic allegiance over political attachments (see 1923 Report, supra note 
1 at 20). Another reason is that adopting nationality would encourage individuals to abandon their 
citizenship in exchange for another in a low-tax jurisdiction (see Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “International 
Tax as International Law” (2004) 57:4 Tax L Rev 483 at 485-486). 
23. The origin of income should include any and all antecedents, active or passive, which were 
factors actually involved in producing the consequence (generation of income). This approach is 
usually called the “but for” test, or conditio sine qua non, and has long been investigated in the legal 
scholarship on causation in tort law. For an overview, see Richard W Wright, “Causation in Tort Law” 







   
 
 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO 
the creation of such income.24 Determining these factors in a globalized, 
multinational scenario is complicated and often infeasible. A great part of 
JOREDO SURGXFWLRQ WRGD\ ÀRZV IURP LQWHUGHSHQGHQW VXSSO\ DQG GHPDQG 
chains that span across multiple sectors and countries. Some of the 
income generated in global chains derives precisely from the reduction 
in costs associated with sharing of resources across business activities 
throughout the chain. The contribution of the concurrent factors that lead 
WRFRVWUHGXFWLRQFDQKDUGO\EHDFFXUDWHO\DVVLJQHGWRVSHFL¿FORFDWLRQV25 
Intangibles pose a similar problem because they lack physical location and 
EHQH¿WWKH¿UPDVDZKROH26 
Whenever origin-based entitlement theories fail to accurately determine 
the location and degree of contribution of the factors that give rise to a 
given income, a decision about how to allocate taxing rights requires an 
additional moral judgment to be regarded as normatively legitimate. In the 
absence of clear moral criteria, such a decision will be made by either some 
form of dispute resolution or political negotiation. If the former is adopted, 
24. Devereux & Vella, supra note 15 at 10. 
25. Seee.g. Peggy B Musgrave, “Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base” in Charles 
E McLure Jr, ed, 7KH 6WDWH &RUSRUDWLRQ ,QFRPH 7D[ ,VVXHV LQ :RUOGZLGH 8QLWDU\ &RPELQDWLRQ 
6WDQIRUG+RRYHU,QVWLWXWLRQ3UHVVDW ³7KHVH¿UPVDUHLQWHUUHODWHGWKURXJKHFRQRPLHV 
of scale and scope, joint costs, and other factors that render an attempt at separation of activities 
meaningless.”); Reuven S Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, “Formulary Apportionment—Myths and 
Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-
Theorized Formulary Alternative” (2011) 3:3 World Tax J 371 at 379 (noting that multinationals 
ÀRXULVKE\LQWHJUDWLQJIXQFWLRQVLQGL൵HUHQWMXULVGLFWLRQVDQGUHGXFLQJFRVWVWKURXJKV\QHUJ\WKDWWDNHV 
advantage of economics of scope and scale, including research and development costs, transactions 
FRVWVLQIRUPDWLRQDOFRVWVPDQDJHULDOFRVWVDQG¿QDQFHFRVWV0XVJUDYH³&RPELQLQJ´supra note 
16 at 176 (pointing out that with the prevalence of interconnected business operations, economic 
WKHRU\FDQQRWDORQHFDQEHFODLPHGWRFRUUHFWO\DVVLJQSUR¿WVEHWZHHQFRXQWULHV0LFKDHO3'HYHUHX[ 
& John Vella, “Are We Heading towards a Corporate Tax System Fit for the 21st Century?” (2014) 
35:4 Fiscal Stud 449 (noting that in the context of a multinational the numerous factors that contribute 
to the creation of income are often spread over a number of countries, making it impossible to pinpoint 
ZKHUHWKHFUHDWLRQRILQFRPHWRRNSODFH0LFKDHO3'HYHUHX[HWDO³5HVLGXDO3UR¿W$OORFDWLRQE\ 
Income” (2019) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper No 19/01, online: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358291> [perma.cc/A4ZB-72FU] at 13 (explaining that the synergies 
UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIGL൵HUHQWSURGXFWLRQIDFWRUVIURPDOOSDUWVRIDPXOWLQDWLRQDOVSUHDG 
DFURVVWKHZRUOGDUHQRWRQO\KDUGWRFDSWXUHLQSUDFWLFHEXWLPSRVVLEOHWRDOORFDWHWRVSHFL¿FFRUSRUDWH 
units or geographical locations). 
26. See Mitchell A Kane, “Transfer Pricing, Integration and Synergy Intangibles: A Consensus 
Approach to the Arm’s Length Standard” (2014) 6:3 World Tax J 282 at 285 (pointing out that 
intangibles are impossible to locate spatially and, although often extremely valuable, appear to be 
immune to accurate valuation); Jerome R Hellerstein, “Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: 
Replacement of Separate Accounting with Formulary Apportionment” (1993) 60:10 Tax Notes 1131 
DW DUJXLQJWKDWJLYHQWKHGL൶FXOWLHVWRGHWHUPLQHDORFDWLRQIRULQWDQJLEOHVWKH\PLJKWEH 
ignored as a factor for the purposes of allocating taxing rights); Charles E McLure Jr, “U.S. Federal 
Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income from Intangibles” (1997) 14:10 Tax Notes Intl 859 at 


















a purportedly technical solution will eventually conceal a political or moral 
judgment,27 since a straightforward answer based on the stated normative 
standard (namely, an origin-based approach) is, in this case, unavailable. 
,IWKHODWWHULVDGRSWHGWKH¿QDOGHFLVLRQZLOOEHXOWLPDWHO\PDGHRQWKH
EDVLV RI LQÀXHQFH DQG SRZHU 7KH UHVXOWLQJ DOORFDWLRQ RI WD[LQJ ULJKWV 
will eventually favour more powerful countries, compounding global 
inequality.28 Both solutions are problematic for lacking a sound normative 
basis.29 This realization calls for an alternative normative standard when 
an origin-based approach fails to accurately allocate income among states. 
A second limitation of origin-based theories arises from a continued 
shift away from an origin-based approach toward distribution-based 
considerations in tax policy discourse. The sharp disagreements about 
which economic factors should be considered relevant for allocating taxing 
rights have led to a greater consideration of distributional consequences. 
Recent discussions about how to adequately allocate taxing rights 
among states have increasingly relied on economic impact assessments 
to determine which countries will gain and which will lose as a result 
of alternative proposals.30 These discussions suggest that distributional 
27. For a discussion on the relevance of political and moral biases in legal interpretation, see e.g. 
*LOOLDQ.+DG¿HOG³%LDV LQ WKH(YROXWLRQRI/HJDO5XOHV´ *HR/-(ULF$3RVQHU 
“Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and 
Constitutional Reform” (2008) 75:2 U Chicago L Rev 853; Jill Anderson, “Misreading like a Lawyer: 
Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation” (2014) 127:6 Harv L Rev 1521. 
28. )RU D GLVFXVVLRQ DERXW KRZ LQÀXHQFH DQG SRZHU D൵HFW PDWWHUV RI GLVWULEXWLYH MXVWLFH LQ 
international tax policy, see Ivan Ozai, “Two Accounts of International Tax Justice” (2020) 33:2 Can 
-/ 	-XU$QDO\]LQJWKHGL൵HUHQWVWUDQGVRI WD[FRPSHWLWLRQ+XJK$XOWQRWHVWKDWEHVLGHVWKH 
more commonly observed competition for investment, the recent disagreements about how to allocate 
taxing rights to deal with the challenges posed by the digitalization of the economy has unveiled the 
concurrent competition for revenues, which despite largely unnoted, goes back to the work of the 
League of Nations in the 1920s. See Hugh J Ault, “Tax Competition and Tax Cooperation: A Survey 
and Reassessment” in Jérôme Monsenego & Jan Bjuvberg, eds, International Taxation in a Changing 
/DQGVFDSH/LEHU$PLFRUXPLQ+RQRXURI%HUWLO:LPDQ(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2019). 
29. This problem is also similar to the concept of causation in tort law. See William M Landes & 
Richard A Posner, “Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach” (1983) 12:1 J Leg Stud 109 at 
110 (doubting whether it is possible to use an autonomous concept of cause to decide legal cases and 
arguing that the idea of causation is a result rather than a premise of the analysis of cause). See also 
Devereux & Vella, supra note 15 at 10 (noting that the continued pursuit of origin in complex cases 
poses additional hurdles for countries without substantial capacity and resources and that the use of 
arbitrary measures that may proxy for origin brings into question the choice of the normative principle 
LQWKH¿UVWSODFH 
30. See e.g. Christoph Spengel et al, “A Common Corporate Tax Base for Europe: An Impact 
Assessment of the Draft Council Directive on a CC(C)TB” (2012) ZEW Working Paper No 12-
039, online: <www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59576/1/718573498.pdf> [perma.cc/9RDS-69RV] 
DVVHVVLQJ WKH LPSDFWV RQ GL൵HUHQW (8 PHPEHU VWDWHV UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKH DGRSWLRQ RI D FRPPRQ 
corporate tax base); International Monetary Fund, “Spillover in International Corporate Taxation” 
(2014) IMF Policy Paper, online: <www.imf.org> (discussing how the choice of allocation rules 





considerations will at least in part replace the role of the traditional origin-
EDVHG UDWLRQDOH LQ WKH¿QDOGHFLVLRQRQ WKHFULWHULD IRUDOORFDWLQJ WD[LQJ 
ULJKWV 7KLV VKLIW UHTXLUHV D QRUPDWLYH MXVWL¿FDWLRQ WKDW WKH HFRQRPLF 
reasoning behind origin-based theories fails to provide. 
II. 7KHGLৼHUHQWLDODSSURDFK 
1. 'LৼHUHQWLDWLRQ 
An alternative normative approach for allocating rights between nations 
FDQEHFDOOHGGL൵HUHQWLDWLRQ317KHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKGLVWULEXWHVULJKWV 
so as carry out a universal moral objective, in particular one that aligns with 
a concern about global justice.32$GL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOWD[ 
ODZZRXOGWDNHWD[LQJULJKWVDOORFDWLRQDVDVLJQL¿FDQWWRROIRUDGGUHVVLQJ 
global inequality and propose a distribution according to countries’
characteristics such as per capita income or number of inhabitants. 
$OWKRXJK WKH XVH RI GL൵HUHQWLDWLRQ LV VWLOO UHODWLYHO\ XQRUWKRGR[ LW KDV 
been embraced in some areas of international law. In international labour 
“Sharing the Corporate Tax Base: Equitable Taxing of Multinationals and the Choice of Formulary 
Apportionment” (2018) 25:2 Transnat’l Corp 67 (analyzing the various distributional consequences 
RIGL൵HUHQWIRUPXODVXQGHUIRUPXODU\DSSRUWLRQPHQW5XXG$GH0RRLM/L/LX 	'LQDU3ULKDUGLQL 
“An Assessment of Global Formula Apportionment” (2019) IMF Working Paper No 19/213, 
online: <imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/10/11/An-Assessment-of-Global-Formula-
Apportionment-48718> [perma.cc/2K96-3ZYM] (assessing the revenue implications for individual 
countries under alternative formulas under a unitary tax system); Alex Cobham, Tommaso Faccio & 
Valpy FitzGerald, “Global Inequalities in Taxing Rights: An Early Evaluation of the OECD Tax Reform 
Proposals” (October 2019), online: <osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/j3p48> [perma.cc/N68A-KW3S] 
(discussing the revenue impacts of tax reform proposals considered by the OECD on lower-income 
FRXQWULHV ³2(&' 3UHVHQWV $QDO\VLV 6KRZLQJ 6LJQL¿FDQW ,PSDFW RI 3URSRVHG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7D[ 
Reforms” OECD (13 February 2020), online: <www.oecd.org> (reporting the economic implications 
expected from the reform proposals recently advanced by the OECD over low-, middle-, and high-
LQFRPHFRXQWULHV6HEDVWLDQ%HHUHWDO³([SORULQJ5HVLGXDO3UR¿W$OORFDWLRQ´ ,0):RUNLQJ 
3DSHU1RRQOLQHLPIRUJHQ3XEOLFDWLRQV:3,VVXHV([SORULQJ5HVLGXDO3UR¿W 





32. Alexander Cappelen calls this the assignment approach. See Alexander W Cappelen, “The Moral 
5DWLRQDOH IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LVFDO/DZ´ (WKLFV 	,QWO$൵DW ³$FKDUDFWHULVWLF 
IHDWXUHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO¿VFDO ODZ LV WKDWFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQGRQRW 
have any role in the distribution of tax rights. The assignment approach would challenge this feature of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO¿VFDOODZEDVHGRQZKDWZHFRXOGFDOOWKHGLVWULEXWLRQDOREMHFWLRQ,QLWVJHQHUDOYHUVLRQ 
WKLVREMHFWLRQSRLQWVRXWWKDWEHQH¿WVDULVLQJIURPVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSVPLJKWZRUNWRWKHGLVDGYDQWDJH 
of those who are most in need.”). 















   
 
2ULJLQDQG'LႇHUHQWLDWLRQLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QFRPH$OORFDWLRQ  
law,33 law of the sea,34 international trade law,35 international climate law,36 
and international patent law,37 WKH FRQFHSW RI GL൵HUHQWLDO WUHDWPHQW KDV 
been explicitly used as a way to foster substantive equality among states 
with varying levels of capacity. 
'L൵HUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQW typically comprises non-reciprocal arrangements 
aimed at promoting substantive equality between countries.38 The rationale 
EHKLQGGL൵HUHQWLDWLRQLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZOLHVLQWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWIRUPDO 
equal treatment can secure equality only among parties at an identical 
RUVLPLODU OHYHORIHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOSRZHUDQG WKDWGL൵HUHQWLDWHG 
WUHDWPHQW LV ZDUUDQWHG WR FRUUHFW LQHTXDOLWLHV DPRQJ GL൵HUHQW SDUWLHV39 
'L൵HUHQWLDWLRQ FDQ DOVR IRVWHU FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG IDFLOLWDWH WKH H൵HFWLYH 
implementation of international norms.40 
2. Normative basis 
7KH GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK EXLOGV PRVWO\ RQ GLVWULEXWLYH MXVWLFH 
considerations. The international tax regime constitutes a strong and largely 
non-voluntary economic association between countries, which raises 
special associative duties—duties owed to parties with whom one stands in 
a robust relationship or interaction41—one of which is the requirement that 
33. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 1 April 1919 at Article 19(3) (entered 
into force 28 June 1919). 
34. 8QLWHG1DWLRQV&RQYHQWLRQRQ WKH/DZRI WKH6HD, 10 December 1982, UNTS 1883-1885 at 
Articles 61-62 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
35. *HQHUDO$JUHHPHQWRQ7DULৼVDQG7UDGH, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS at Article XVIII (entered 
into force 1 January 1948). 
36. 8QLWHG1DWLRQV)UDPHZRUN&RQYHQWLRQRQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH, 9 May 1992, at Article 3(1). 
37. $JUHHPHQWRQ7UDGH5HODWHG$VSHFWVRI,QWHOOHFWXDO3URSHUW\5LJKWV, 15 April 1994, at Articles 
65(2), 65(4), 66(2), and 67. 
38. 'L൵HUHQWLDO WUHDWPHQW UHFRJQL]HV WKH OLPLWV RI D V\VWHP EDVHG RQ D ¿FWLRQ RI OHJDO HTXDOLW\ 
between states that imposes reciprocity of commitments by all state parties to any treaty. See Daniel 
Barstow Magraw, “/HJDO7UHDWPHQWRI'HYHORSLQJ&RXQWULHV'L൵HUHQWLDO&RQWH[WXDODQG$EVROXWH 
Norms” (1990) 1:1 Colo J Intl Envtl L & Poly 69. For a discussion in international taxation about rules 
that are nominally reciprocal but substantively asymmetrical, see Steven A Dean, “More Cooperation, 
Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime” (2009) 84 Tul 
L Rev 125. 
39. See Oscar Schachter, “The Evolving Law of International Development” (1976) 15:1 Colum J 
7UDQVQDW¶O/ JURXQGLQJGL൵HUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWRQDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIQHHGDVEDVLVIRUHQWLWOHPHQW 
3KLOLSSH&XOOHW³'L൵HUHQWLDO7UHDWPHQWLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ7RZDUGVD1HZ3DUDGLJPRI,QWHUVWDWH 
Relations” (1999) 10:3 EJIL 549 at 550; Frank J Garcia, 7UDGH ,QHTXDOLW\DQG-XVWLFH7RZDUGD 
/LEHUDO7KHRU\RI-XVW7UDGH 1HZ<RUN7UDQVQDWLRQDO3XEOLVKHUV WDNLQJGL൵HUHQWLDWLRQDVD 
mechanism to achieve wealth redistribution in the face of substantial inequalities); Eduardo Tempone, 
³6SHFLDODQG'L൵HUHQWLDO7UHDWPHQW´LQ5GLJHU:ROIUXPHGV0D[3ODQFN(QF\FORSHGLDRI3XEOLF 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
40. Cullet, supra note 39; Tempone, supra note 39. For a related discussion in the context of tax 
competition, see Ivan Ozai, “Tax Competition and the Ethics of Burden Sharing” (2018) 42:1 Fordham 
Intl LJ 61. 
41. These duties are sometimes called relational duties. See Andrea Sangiovanni, “On the Relation 
















international institutions do not become sources of privileges to wealthier, 
more powerful participants.42 More broadly, the current level of economic 
integration of nations has made the global economy a substantial presence 
in the lives of all states, and economic regulation and policy decisions 
WRGD\ WDNHSODFH LQ DJOREDO VHWWLQJ WKDW LV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ LQWHUGHSHQGHQW 
The fact that rules made by a state (or by a supranational rule-making 
body) are consequential to other states raises the need for some degree of 
coordination and equity beyond the national level.43 
3. Application 
7KHRULJLQEDVHGDQGWKHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKHVOHDGWRPDUNHGO\GLVWLQFW 
distributional outcomes. The latter aims to reduce international inequalities 
by allocating greater rights to lower-income states, whereas the former 
tends to maintain or increase the existing inequalities. The question 
about which of these normative approaches should apply to taxing right 
allocation leads to the more fundamental question about whether principles 
of distributive justice should be constrained to the domestic realm or 
extend to the international domain.44 Within the spectrum of the various 
normative accounts of global justice, this article takes an intermediary 
stance that recognizes the existence of some duties of distributive justice 
Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 55 [Brock, “Cosmopolitanism”]. 
42. Darrel Moellendorf, “Cosmopolitanism and Compatriot Duties” (2011) 94:4 Monist 535. See 
also Brock, “Cosmopolitanism,” supra note 41, 222. 
43. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?” (2006) 34:2 Phil & Pub 
$൵DW 
44. This discussion is generally referred to as the problem of global justice. On one end stands global 
cosmopolitanism, which argues that normative requirements of distributive justice should apply at the 
global level. Cosmopolitan theorists generally share the belief that human beings—and not families, 
cultures, or nations—are the ultimate units of moral concerns and thereby should be treated equally 
regardless of nationality or citizenship. On the other end stands statism, which typically claims that 
no duty of egalitarian distributive justice exists outside the state. Statists usually accept that we have 
universal duties to humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need, but these duties are limited and 
not grounded on principles of distributive justice. Early works embracing global cosmopolitanism are 
Charles Beitz, 3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1973) and Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). More recent 
theories of global cosmopolitanism include Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2002); Kok-Chor Tan, -XVWLFHZLWKRXW%RUGHUV&RVPRSROLWDQLVP1DWLRQDOLVPDQG 
Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Simon Caney, -XVWLFH%H\RQG%RUGHUV 
$ *OREDO 3ROLWLFDO 7KHRU\ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). One important representative 
RI VWDWLVP LV 7KRPDV 1DJHO ³7KH 3UREOHP RI *OREDO -XVWLFH´   3KLO 	 3XE$൵  
Frequently deemed as representatives of a moderate statist view include Michael Blake, “Distributive 
-XVWLFH6WDWH&RHUFLRQDQG$XWRQRP\´ 3KLO 	3XE$൵6DPXHO)UHHPDQ³7KH/DZ 
of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice” (2006) 23:1 Soc Phil & 
Pol’y 29. For a discussion about the statist view applied to international tax policy, see Laurens van 










to those applied domestically.45 
Applied to the problem of allocating taxing rights between states, this 
middle ground position on global justice entails a normative compromise 
between an origin-based approach (which is premised on state sovereignty) 
DQG D GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK ZKLFK DOORZV IRU FRQVLGHUDWLRQV RI JOREDO 
justice). The fundamental question is how to reconcile these two normative 
approaches. 
This article does not provide a full answer to this question, but it 
DUJXHVWKDWDGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKVKRXOGDSSO\DWOHDVWLQFDVHVZKHUHDQ 
origin-based approach fails to serve as a normative guide for distributing 
the international tax base. This may happen when one of the two cases 
GLVFXVVHG LQ 6HFWLRQ , WDNHV SODFH )LUVW WKH GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK LV 
warranted in cases in which it is impossible to accurately pinpoint the 
factors that contributed to the creation of a given income and, more 
importantly, the degree of contribution of each of these factors. Whenever 
WKLVSUDFWLFDOGL൶FXOW\DULVHVDGHFLVLRQDERXWKRZWRDOORFDWHWD[LQJULJKWV 
will be arbitrary from a moral standpoint unless it is based on some other 
QRUPDWLYHFULWHULD,QWKHVHFDVHVWKHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKVHHPVWREHWKH 
PRVWFRPSHOOLQJDOWHUQDWLYHQRUPDWLYHEDVLV,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDMXVWL¿DEOH 
normative criterion for allocating taxing rights, priority should be given 
to a solution that promotes, rather than departs from, distributive justice. 
7KHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKLVDOVRZDUUDQWHGZKHQHYHUWD[SROLF\GHVLJQ 
gives priority to distributional considerations over a clear origin-based 
rationale. When the decision about how to allocate taxing rights depends 
PRUHRQLWVGLVWULEXWLRQDOFRQVHTXHQFHVWKDQRQFULWHULDFOHDUO\MXVWL¿DEOH 
by an origin-based principle, such decision will be normatively arbitrary 
in the absence of alternative normative criteria. Once again, this gives rise 
WRDFODLPIRUWKHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFK0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\DGHFLVLRQEDVHG 
on distributional consequences requires a normative rationale that takes 
distributive justice into consideration. If the criteria for allocating taxing 
45. It is mostly aligned with what Laura Valentini has called the “third wave” of global justice, which 
provides “a sustained critical discussion of cosmopolitanism and statism, and a fresh perspective 
helping us to steer a middle course between them” (Laura Valentini, -XVWLFHLQD*OREDOL]HG:RUOG 
A Normative Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3-4. According to Valentini, 
two representatives of this position are Gillian Brock, *OREDO -XVWLFH $ &RVPRSROLWDQ $FFRXQW
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and David Miller, 1DWLRQDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG *OREDO 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Yet, as she notes, these authors explicitly place 
themselves respectively in the cosmopolitan and statist traditions. See also Jon Mandle, *OREDO-XVWLFH
&DPEULGJH8.3ROLW\3UHVV6HEDWLDQR0D൵HWWRQH³*OREDO-XVWLFH%HWZHHQ/HYLDWKDQDQG 
Cosmopolis” (2012) 3:4 Global Pol’y 443; Mathias Risse, 2Q*OREDO-XVWLFH (Princeton: Princeton 









countries, the underlying normative principle for this allocation must more 
broadly consider whether the resulting distribution will improve or worsen 
the relative welfare across these countries. 
III. Practical implications 
+DYLQJHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKVKRXOGDSSO\ZKHQRULJLQ 
based approaches fail to serve as a normative guide, the next logical step 
LVGHWHUPLQLQJZKHQWKHODWWHULVVX൶FLHQWO\LQDFFXUDWHRULQDSSOLFDEOHDV 
to trigger the former. This determination requires settling the degree of 
failure of the origin-based approach with which we can come to terms. 
On one end of the spectrum, one could tolerate an absolute degree of 
failure and take the existing proxies for origin of income as acceptable 
from a normative standpoint. This is the view implicitly adopted, for 
example, by those who consider that the current allocation of taxing rights 
LVQRUPDWLYHO\MXVWL¿HG7KHPDLQSUREOHPZLWKWDNLQJWKLVVWDQFHLVWKDW 
the more complex it is to determine the underlying factors of income 
generation, the more inaccurate origin-based approaches are in establishing 
proxies for origin of income. Similarly, the more reliant the decision about 
taxing rights allocation is on political and distributional considerations, 
the less aligned such proxies are to the origin-based rationale. It follows 
that these proxies become increasingly arbitrary. On the opposite end, 
one could be as strict as to conclude that any origin-based approach will 
be arbitrary to some degree as to require its replacement altogether for 
another normative approach.46 The main problem with this stance is that 
it fails to acknowledge the normative validity of origin-based theories and 
WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI VWDWH VRYHUHLJQW\ LQ WRGD\¶V VWDWH RI D൵DLUV ,I RQH LV 




in cases where the failure of origin-based criteria is most evident. The 
DOORFDWLRQRIFRUSRUDWHSUR¿WVWKURXJKIRUPXODU\DSSRUWLRQPHQWLVDFDVH 
LQ SRLQW7KH IROORZLQJ ZLOO GLVFXVV ZK\ D GL൵HUHQWLDO VKRXOG DSSO\ LQ 
those cases and what it would entail. 
1. 3UR¿WDSSRUWLRQPHQWLQDJOREDOXQLWDU\V\VWHP 
In recent years, many scholars have called for a departure from separate 
accounting under the arm’s-length principle toward a unitary taxation 











earned by multinational corporations are allocated among jurisdictions. 
A unitary taxation system under formulary apportionment would allocate 
PXOWLQDWLRQDOV¶SUR¿WVEDVHGRQDIRUPXOD WKDWFRQVLGHUV WKH ORFDWLRQRI 
economic factors. The shift toward unitary taxation is generally touted as 
a way to eliminate the complexity of transfer pricing rules and associated 
administrative and compliance costs, as well as to reduce economic 
distortions caused by the current system and incentives for tax avoidance 
practices.47 
One important and challenging aspect of adopting a unitary tax 
VFKHPHKRZHYHULVVHWWOLQJRQWKHIRUPXODWKDWZLOOGHWHUPLQHKRZSUR¿WV 
are allocated among jurisdictions. Proposals for formulary apportionment 
frequently take an origin-based approach and suggest a multi-factor 
formula based on a combination of the economic factors that contributed 
WRWKHJHQHUDWLRQRIWKHSUR¿WVVXFKDVWKHSODFHRIVDOHVSD\UROOH[SHQVHV 
DQGSK\VLFDODVVHWV'L൵HUHQWSURSRVDOVVXJJHVWYDU\LQJZHLJKWVWRHDFKRI 
these factors.48 Similarly, jurisdictions that adopt formulary apportionment 
in intra-state allocation of income use a variety of formulas. The United 
States and Canada provide prominent examples. These two countries adopt 
WKHIRUPXODU\DSSRUWLRQPHQWPRGHO WRDOORFDWHSUR¿WVDPRQJVWDWHVDQG 
provinces. The experience from these countries points to a considerable 
arbitrariness from a normative standpoint in how formulas and weights 
are chosen. Canadian provinces have adopted a formula that weights 
equally on payroll and gross receipts.4986VWDWHVKDYHHDFKXVHGGL൵HUHQW 
IRUPXODVWKDWVHHPWRVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHO\RQSUDJPDWLVP2YHUWLPHVWDWHV 
have gradually shifted to sales as the main allocating factor, not because of 
47. 6HH HJ -LQ\DQ /L ³*OREDO 3UR¿W 6SOLW$Q (YROXWLRQDU\$SSURDFK WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ,QFRPH 
Allocation” (2002) 50:3 Can Tax J 823; Walter Hellerstein, “Income Allocation in the Twenty-First 
Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment” (2005) 12:3 Int’l 
Transfer Pricing J 103; Susan C Morse, “Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment” (2010) 29:4 Va 
Tax Rev 593; Reuven S Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A Clausing & Michael C Durst, “Allocating Business 
3UR¿WVIRU7D[3XUSRVHV$3URSRVDOWR$GRSWD)RUPXODU\3UR¿W6SOLW´)OD7D[5HY 
48. )RUDEULHIDQDO\VLVRIWKHGLVWULEXWLYHRXWFRPHRIGL൵HUHQWIRUPXODVVHH+HLQ].ODXV.URSSHQ 
5RPDQ'DZLG 	5LFKDUG 6FKPLGWNH ³3UR¿W 6SOLW WKH )XWXUH RI7UDQVIHU 3ULFLQJ"$UP¶V/HQJWK 
Principle and Formulary Apportionment Revisited from a Theoretical and a Practical Perspective” in 
Wolfgang Schön & Kai A Konrad, eds, Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and 
Economics (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 267 at 273-276. 
49. See Joann Martens Weiner, “Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European 
Union: Insights from the United States and Canada” (2005) Directorate-General for Taxation and 

















its normative appeal but to reduce the incentives for corporations to move 
jobs and property out of state.50 
,WLVODUJHO\DFFHSWHGWKDWDQ\SRVVLEOHFRPELQDWLRQZLOOEHVLJQL¿FDQWO\ 
arbitrary from a normative point of view, given the impossibility of 
determining the degree to which each factor contributes to the generation 
RI D PXOWLQDWLRQDO¶V SUR¿WV51 Yet, the formula ultimately chosen for 
DSSRUWLRQLQJ SUR¿WV ZLOO KDYH PDMRU GLVWULEXWLRQDO LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU 
countries.52 It is thus unsurprising that impact assessment studies, however 
limited they may be, given data constraints, have grown in importance in 
tax policy discussions about whether to adopt unitary taxation and how to 
determine the appropriate formula.53 
7KHVH WZR IDFWRUV WKH LQVX൶FLHQF\ RI RULJLQEDVHG FULWHULD WR 
DSSRUWLRQSUR¿WVDQGWKHLQFUHDVLQJUROHRIGLVWULEXWLRQDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ 
the tax policy decision-making) give rise to the normative priority of the 
GL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFK7KHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHGLVWULEXWLRQ 
of the international tax base improve rather than worsen global inequality. 
It requires that one or more international development indicators be 
included as a contributing factor to the apportionment formula. Including 
a direct measure of international inequality in the formula is perhaps the 
50. See Michael Mazerov, “The Single-Sales-Factor Formula: A Boon to Economic Development 
or a Costly Giveaway?” (2001) 20 State Tax Notes 1775 (noting the weak economic rationale behind 
the shift toward a single-sales-factor formula); Jack Mintz, “Europe Slowly Lurches to a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Issues at Stake” in Wolfgang Schön, Ulrich Schreiber & Christoph 
Spengel, eds, $&RPPRQ&RQVROLGDWHG&RUSRUDWH7D[%DVHIRU(XURSH (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 
2008). For some legal implications of a sales-based formula at the international level, see Charles 
E McLure Jr & Walter Hellerstein, “Does Sales-Only Apportionment of Corporate Income Violate 
International Trade Rules?” (2002) 27 Tax Notes Int’l 1315. The shift toward a single-sales factor is 
DOVRDWWULEXWHGWRWKHGL൶FXOW\RIDFFXUDWHO\YDOXLQJSURSHUW\6HH0RUVHsupra note 47. 
51. See Peggy B Musgrave, “Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and 
Applications to the European Union” in Sijbren Cnossen, ed, Taxing Capital Income in the European 
8QLRQ ,VVXHV DQG 2SWLRQV IRU 5HIRUP (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) (“There does not 
DSSHDUWREHDQ\REMHFWLYHVLQJOHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZFRPSDQ\SUR¿WVVKRXOGEHGLYLGHGLQ 
a multijurisdictional setting” at 46); Tim Edgar, “Corporate Income Tax Coordination as a Response 
to International Tax Competition and International Tax Arbitrage” (2003) 51:3 Can Tax J 1079 
³IRUPXODU\ DOORFDWLRQ DSSURDFKHV FDQQRW EH MXVWL¿HG DV UHDOL]LQJ VRPH FRUUHFW DOORFDWLRQ GH¿QHG 
in any precise normative sense” at 1154); Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 47 at 516-517 
(acknowledging that any formula can produce arbitrary results in a given industry but arguing that 
the present separate accounting system is equally or more arbitrary); James R Hines Jr, “Income 
Misattribution Under Formula Apportionment” (2010) 54:1 Eur Econ Rev 108 (showing that formulas 
included in proposals for formulary apportionment are not strongly correlated with determinants of 
business incomes). 
52. Faccio & Fitzgerald, supra note 30. 
53. See e.g. International Monetary Fund, supra note 30; Alex Cobham & Simon Loretz, 
³,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'LVWULEXWLRQ RI WKH &RUSRUDWH 7D[ %DVH ,PSOLFDWLRQV RI 'L൵HUHQW $SSRUWLRQPHQW 
Factors under Unitary Taxation” (2014) International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper 
No 27, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587839> [perma.cc/J6BW-HVUQ]; Faccio & Fitzgerald, 












7KLVGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFK LVPRUH VXLWDEOH IRUDGGUHVVLQJJOREDO MXVWLFH 
concerns and brings greater transparency regarding normative rationale 
and distributional outcomes. 
2. 5HVLGXDOSUR¿WDOORFDWLRQ 
Rather than a complete overhaul of the current international tax system, 
some have argued for incremental use of formulary apportionment. In this 
case, formulary apportionment would only apply to the residual portion 
RI PXOWLQDWLRQDOV¶ SUR¿WV LQ H[FHVV RI D VWDQGDUG UDWH RI UHWXUQ WKDW LV 
WKHSRUWLRQRIWKHSUR¿WVWKDWH[FHHGVZKDWDWKLUGSDUW\ZRXOGH[SHFWWR 
earn for performing functions and activities on an outsourcing basis.55 Its 
proponents argue that the adoption of formulary apportionment for residual 
SUR¿WV ZRXOG LPSURYH WKH FXUUHQW WUDQVIHU SULFLQJ UHJLPH E\ UHGXFLQJ 
opportunities for tax avoidance and eliminating relevant compliance and 
administrative costs.56 
Compared to proposals for unitary taxation, the idea of a formulary 
DOORFDWLRQ RI UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV VHHPV WR SUHVHQW IHZHU REMHFWLRQV E\ 
supporters of the current transfer pricing regime, mostly because transfer 
SULFLQJUXOHVZRXOGVWLOODSSO\WRURXWLQHSUR¿WVWKDWLVWRWKHSRUWLRQRI 
SUR¿WV WKDW LV GHHPHG WR FRUUHVSRQG WR D QRUPDO UHWXUQ 3URSRQHQWV RI 
UHVLGXDOSUR¿WDSSURDFKHVRIWHQSUHIHUDIRUPXODKHDYLO\ZHLJKWHGRQWKH 
ORFDWLRQ RI ¿QDO VDOHV 7KH PDLQ UHDVRQV IRU D VDOHVEDVHG IRUPXOD DUH 
generally the reduced incentives for businesses to move payroll or assets 
WR ORZWD[ MXULVGLFWLRQV VPDOOHU GLVWRUWLQJ LQÀXHQFH RQ UHDO HFRQRPLF 
decisions, and greater likelihood of international coordination.57 
In a context where the transfer pricing regime is maintained, 
DSSRUWLRQLQJ UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV RQ D IRUPXODLF EDVLV VHHPV D SURPLVLQJ 
approach. It also seems correct to argue that an origin-based approach 
54. Although the most common approach would be to use per capita income as a reference, other 
indexes may be more appropriate to measure and compare international inequality. See Anthony C 
Infanti, “Internation Equity and Human Development” in Miranda Stewart & Yariv Brauner, eds, Tax 
Law and Development (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 209 (arguing for expanding the focus 
of inter-nation equity beyond economic growth to incorporate other non-economic considerations, 
such as feminist, social or strategic, and proposing the use of other indexes which include non-
HFRQRPLFGLPHQVLRQVDVFULWHULDIRUDGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKVXFKDVWKH+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW,QGH[ 
(HDI), the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), Gender Inequality Index (GII), and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID)). See also Kim Brooks, “Global Distributive Justice: The Potential 
for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax Revenue Allocation” (2009) 21:2 CJWL 267 (arguing that 
one of the implications of a feminist analysis of international tax policy is the requirement to allocate 
greater taxing rights to lower-income countries). 
55.  See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 47; Devereux et al, supra note 25. 
56. Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 25. 






should account for the contribution of sales in the creation of income. 
The problem, however, is that there is no clear normative basis for 
allocating residual SUR¿WV WR MXULVGLFWLRQV ZKHUH VDOHV WDNH SODFH 6DOHV 
may be a relevant contributing factor for routineSUR¿WVEXWLWLVGL൶FXOW 
to make a direct connection between sales contribution and the generation 
RI UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV58 5HVLGXDO SUR¿WV E\ GH¿QLWLRQ DUH QRW GLUHFWO\ 
DWWULEXWDEOHWRDQ\VSHFL¿FHFRQRPLFIDFWRU5HVLGXDOSUR¿WLVWKHUHWXUQ 
resulting from the interaction of the constituent parts of a multinational 
WKDW FDQQRW EH DVVLJQHG WR DQ\ RI LWV FRPSRQHQWV ZLWKRXW D VLJQL¿FDQW 




From a political viewpoint, this might loosely appease the demands of 
sales jurisdictions for greater taxing rights (see Section III.3). But from 
DQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH WKHSURSRVDO LVSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVH LWEHQH¿WV 





an origin-based approach could be used to determine the states to which 
UHVLGXDOSUR¿WVDUHDOORFDWHG QH[XVLWLVXQDEOHWRSURYLGHDQ\JXLGDQFH 
IRUKRZWRGLVWULEXWHWKHUHVLGXDOSUR¿WVEHWZHHQWKHVHVWDWHV DOORFDWLRQ 
$GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK VHHPV WR SURYLGH DPRUH DSSURSULDWHQRUPDWLYH 
EDVLV IRU DOORFDWLQJ UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV ,W ZRXOG UHTXLUH WKH DVVLJQPHQW RI 
UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV WR WKH UHOHYDQW MXULVGLFWLRQV EDVHG HQWLUHO\ RQ D GLUHFW 
PHDVXUH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQHTXDOLW\$ GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK VKRXOG DOVR 
SURYLGH WKH VDPH SUDFWLFDO DGYDQWDJHV RI VDOHVEDVHG UHVLGXDO SUR¿W 
allocation as to its reduced susceptibility to tax avoidance and distortion 
on economic decisions due to the absolute immobility of development 
indexes to business decisions. 
3. The OECD’s “new taxing right” 
,Q2FWREHUWKH2(&'6HFUHWDULDWDGYDQFHGDSURSRVDOIRUD³XQL¿HG 
approach.”607KHXQL¿HGDSSURDFKDGRSWVDIRUPXODU\DSSURDFKWRSDUWLDOO\ 
58. See Devereux & Vella, supraQRWHDW SRLQWLQJRXWWKHGL൶FXOWLHVLQDOORFDWLQJUHVLGXDO 
SUR¿WVDFFRUGLQJWRRULJLQEDVHGDSSURDFKHV 
59. See Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. 
International Taxation” (1995) 15:1 Va Tax Rev 89 at 148-149. 
60. OECD, 6HFUHWDULDW3URSRVDOIRUD³8QL¿HG$SSURDFK´XQGHU3LOODU2QH3XEOLF&RQVXOWDWLRQ 











   
 
2ULJLQDQG'LႇHUHQWLDWLRQLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QFRPH$OORFDWLRQ  
VKLIW WKHDOORFDWLRQRIPXOWLQDWLRQDOV¶SUR¿WV WR³PDUNHW MXULVGLFWLRQV´61 
The proposal has come as a response to demands from various countries to 
XSGDWHWKHFXUUHQWDOORFDWLRQRISUR¿WVJHQHUDWHGE\GLJLWDOL]HGEXVLQHVVHV 
7KHSKUDVH³XQL¿HGDSSURDFK´ LQGLFDWHV WKH2(&'¶VVWDWHG LQWHQWLRQ WR
DFKLHYHD FRPSURPLVH VROXWLRQ WKDW VDWLV¿HVDOO FRQÀLFWLQJSURSRVDOV DW 
the table, namely the European Union’s focus on user participation, the 
US preference for considering marketing intangibles, and the Group of 
Twenty-Four’s proposal for allocating income based on multinationals’
VLJQL¿FDQW HFRQRPLF SUHVHQFH62 7KH XQL¿HG DSSURDFK DOORFDWHV RQO\ D 
SRUWLRQRIUHVLGXDOSUR¿WVWRPDUNHWMXULVGLFWLRQVWKXVFUHDWLQJZKDWZDV 
labelled as the “new taxing right.”63 
From a normative perspective, the “new taxing right” presents a 
VLPLODUSUREOHPWRSURSRVDOVIRUUHVLGXDOSUR¿WDOORFDWLRQGLVFXVVHGLQWKH 
previous section. Origin-based approaches do not provide a satisfactory 
QRUPDWLYH EDVLV IRU DOORFDWLQJ UHVLGXDO SUR¿WV 6HYHUDO DVSHFWV RI WKH 
OECD’s proposal demonstrate the lack of a solid normative rationale. The 
VWDWHGJRDORIDGGUHVVLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRIVSHFL¿FVWDWHVQDPHO\FRXQWULHV 
with large consumer markets, and the stated concern about potential 
unilateral measures from these countries are evidence that political 
PRWLYDWLRQVZHUHPRUHVLJQL¿FDQW WKDQQRUPDWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV64 Two 
main aspects of how the new approach has been advanced also make this 
clear. First, the portion attributable to market jurisdictions is not based on 
any clear economic criteria but will likely be determined by an agreed-
XSRQ¿[HGSHUFHQWDJH657KH¿QDOVKDUHRIPDUNHWMXULVGLFWLRQVZLOOWKXV 
rely on some form of political agreement rather than on a normative 
VWDQG$QG GLVFXVVLRQV DERXW WKH DSSURSULDWH ¿[HG SHUFHQWDJH ZLOO EH 
61. According to the OECD, the phrase refers to the jurisdiction where customers or users are 
located. See OECD, 3URJUDPPHRI:RUN WR'HYHORSD&RQVHQVXV6ROXWLRQ WR WKH7D[&KDOOHQJHV 
$ULVLQJIURPWKH'LJLWDOLVDWLRQRIWKH(FRQRP\,QFOXVLYH)UDPHZRUNRQ%(36 (Paris: OECD, 2019) 
at 23. 
62. For a detailed discussion about the political struggles and distributional implications involving 
these proposals, see Allison Christians & Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes, “A New Global Tax Deal for the 
Digital Age” (2019) 67:4 Can Tax J 1153. 
63. ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKLV IRUPXODEDVHG DSSURDFK ZKLFK WKH 2(&' FDOOV$PRXQW$ WKH XQL¿HG 
DSSURDFK LQFOXGHV D ¿[HG EDVHOLQH UHWXUQ IRU URXWLQH PDUNHWIDFLQJ DFWLYLWLHV $PRXQW % DQG 
incremental return attributable to a jurisdiction when Amount B falls short of the market-based routine 
return assumed under the application of the arm’s-length principle (Amount C). For an overview, see 
.DUWLNH\D6LQJK:-RH0XUSK\ 	*UHJRU\-2VVL³7KH2(&'¶V8QL¿HG$SSURDFK²$Q$QDO\VLVRI 
the Revised Regime for Taxing Rights and Income Allocation” (2020) 97 Tax Notes Int’l 549. 
64. See OECD, 6HFUHWDULDW3URSRVDO, supra note 60 (explicitly acknowledging the need to achieve 
a compromise solution to avoid encouraging “more jurisdictions to adopt uncoordinated unilateral 
tax measures,” which “would undermine the relevance and sustainability of the international tax 
framework, and would damage global investment and growth” at 4). 









from a normative point of view, a fairly arbitrary exercise. Second, the 
unconcealed consideration of the distributional consequences of the 
SURSRVDO DV D FRQGLWLRQ IRU DFKLHYLQJ D ¿QDO DJUHHPHQW VKRZV D PRYH 
from an origin-based approach (which allocates taxing rights based on 
WKHUHOHYDQFHRIHDFKHFRQRPLFIDFWRUWRWKHJHQHUDWLRQRISUR¿WVWRZDUG 
a distribution-based approach (which allocates taxing rights based on the 
actual distributional outcome of the possible alternatives).66 This shift 
towards distributional considerations requires a re-evaluation of current 
QRUPDWLYHFULWHULDIRUDOORFDWLQJSUR¿WVDPRQJVWDWHV7KHGHSDUWXUHIURP 
an origin-based rationale implies that origin-based principles cease to 
provide normative guidance for allocating taxing rights. 
In a context where distributional implications take precedence over 
other considerations, principles of distributive justice become even more 
relevant. Although the distributional impacts of the “new taxing right” 
are still unclear, it will likely disfavour low-income countries with small 
consumer markets.67 &RQYHUVHO\ D GL൵HUHQWLDO DSSURDFK UHTXLUHV WKDW D 
UHDOORFDWLRQ RI WD[LQJ ULJKWV EHQH¿W FRXQWULHV EDVHG RQ WKHLU UHODWLYH 
development needs. 
Conclusion 
The current international tax regime is generally guided by origin-based 
approaches, which distribute taxing rights between states based on the 
location of the factors that contribute to the creation of income. Although 
QRUPDWLYHO\ MXVWL¿DEOH LQ WKHRU\ RULJLQEDVHG WKHRULHV IDLO WR SURYLGH 
satisfactory guidance for allocating taxing rights both when it is impossible 
to pinpoint the factors that gave rise to a given income and when tax policy 
66. The importance of impact assessments of the proposal is emphasized by the OECD and by 
commentators’ analyses. See e.g. OECD, “Webcast: Update on Economic Analysis and Impact 
Assessment” 13 February 2020, online: <oecd.org/tax/beps/webcast-economic-analysis-impact-
assessment-february-2020.htm> [perma.cc/CTS9-K7C4]; OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising from the 
Digitalisation of the Economy Update on the Economic Analysis & Impact Assessment,” online (pdf): 
<oecd.org/tax/beps/presentation-economic-analysis-impact-assessment-webcast-february-2020.pdf> 
[perma.cc/DJP5-7C32]; Allison Christians, “OECD Digital Economy Designers: Share Your Work!” 
(2020) 97 Tax Notes Int’l 1251 (noting that the information provided in February 2020 by the OECD 
ZDVRQO\SDUWLDO²DZHEFDVWDQGDIHZVOLGHVRXWOLQLQJLWV¿QGLQJV²DQGWKHXQGHUO\LQJGDWDWKDWOHG 
to these results was not made publicly available, raising questions about transparency and inclusivity). 
67. See Christians & Magalhaes, supra QRWH  DW  VKRZLQJ WKDW WKH VKLIW RI SUR¿WV 
DOORFDWLRQWRZDUGORFDWLRQRIFRQVXPHUVZLOOPRVWO\EHQH¿WFRXQWULHVZLWKODUJHUFRQVXPHUPDUNHWV 
such as EU countries, the U.S., and middle-income countries rather than lower-income ones); Cobham, 
Faccio & FitzGerald, supra note 30 (concluding that the reallocation of taxing rights deriving from 
OECD’s proposal is likely to reduce revenues for several low-income countries). See also Stephanie 
Soong Johnston, “Politicians Refocusing on Global Tax Reform Talks, OECD Tax Chief Says” (2020) 




design moves away from an origin-based rationale toward one based on 
distributive considerations. 
5HFHQW SURSRVDOV WR DOORFDWH FRUSRUDWH SUR¿WV WKURXJK IRUPXODU\ 
apportionment serve as a point of focus for this article. Formulary 
approaches purportedly rely on an origin-based framework, but origin-
EDVHGFULWHULDKDYHSURYHQWREHLQVX൶FLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKWKHFKRLFHRIWKH 
formula that will ultimately determine how income is assigned between 
countries. Moreover, recent tax policy discussions have demonstrated 
a shift from an origin-based approach (which distributes taxing rights 
based on economic rationale) to a distribution-based one (which gives a 
greater focus to the distributional outcomes resulting from the adoption of 
GL൵HUHQW IRUPXODV7KHGHSDUWXUH IURPRULJLQEDVHGSULQFLSOHV UHTXLUHV 
a reconsideration of the normative foundations for distributing the 
international tax base. 
Whenever origin-based theories fail as a normative guide for 
allocating taxing rights, the absence of alternative normative criteria leads 
WR D VLJQL¿FDQW GHJUHH RI DUELWUDULQHVV$V D FRQVHTXHQFH WKH UHVXOWLQJ 
allocation of rights tends to ultimately favour a few powerful countries. 
7KHGL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKSXW IRUZDUG LQ WKLVDUWLFOHR൵HUVDFRPSHOOLQJ 
normative alternative. By applying distributive justice principles, the 
GL൵HUHQWLDODSSURDFKDOVRSURYLGHVDGHTXDWHJXLGDQFHLQDFRQWH[WZKHUH 
impact assessments and distributional implications assume increasing 
importance in international tax policy discussions. 
 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO
